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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a supervisor at a company that participates in a 
competitive market.  Your company’s success is attributed to its trade 
secrets: technological processes; marketing, production, and distribution 
strategies; etc. that are unknown to your competitors.  One day an 
employee informs you she is leaving your company to work for your 
competitor.  The employee, because of her position, had access to your 
company’s trade secrets; consequently, in the wake of her departure, 
you are concerned about protecting the trade secrets.  What options do 
you have from stopping your employee from taking the position with 
your competitor and using or disclosing your trade secrets?  Because of 
inconsistency in the relevant law, the answer is not simple.  In many 
states you could gain an injunction against the employee from working 
for your competitor if you could show the employee would be unable to 
perform duties for your competitor without inevitably using or 
disclosing your company’s trade secrets: known as the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.  Further, in other states no such protection is 
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afforded and your employee is free to work for your competitor.  
Ultimately, the applicable remedy will differ depending on where the 
action is commenced. 
It is evident that, after analyzing the states’ applications of the 
doctrine, a uniform standard is needed.  The ultimate solution is the 
adoption of federal statutes regulating trade secret law, much like the 
Copyright Act, Patent Act, and Lanham Act regulate the other areas of 
intellectual property.  However, this comment will focus specifically on 
a solution to the states’ inconsistent applications of inevitable disclosure 
by providing (1) an introduction to trade secret law and inevitable 
disclosure; (2) an introduction to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and its 
subsequent enactment by the states; (3) an overview of the Seventh 
Circuit’s application of inevitable disclosure in PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
Redmond; (4) a state-by-state analysis of the doctrine; and finally (5) a 
proposed standard for the uniform application of the doctrine. 
II. TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 
DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction to Trade Secrets 
A trade secret is generally any information that is useful and 
private.1  Trade secret subject matter has been defined by three main 
sources of law.2  The first definition frequently cited comes from the first 
Restatement of Torts, providing that “[a] trade secret may consist of any 
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in 
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”3  This 
definition, although widely cited and still used by some states, has been 
dropped in favor of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,4 
which states, “[a] trade secret is any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage 
over others.”5  However, as will be discussed later, the majority of the 
states adopted the definition presented in the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act.  Ultimately, a trade secret can be summed up as (1) information (2) 
 
1.  JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2010). 
2. Id. 
3. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment B (1939). 
4. POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01. 
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
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that is valuable because of its secrecy and (3) whose owner reasonably 
tries to maintain that secrecy.6 
Additionally, trade secrets are statutorily protected against 
misappropriation as long as they are not publicly disclosed or 
independently created.7  The two general types of misappropriation are 
acquisition by (1) improper means or (2) disclosure.8 
There is no clear definition of “improper means,” so determining 
whether improper means were used to misappropriate a trade secret is 
highly factual and engulfs a wide range of scenarios.9  Improper means 
ranges from an employee copying his employer’s confidential 
information knowing he is leaving the employer,10 to a person renting an 
airplane to photograph a competitor’s under-construction factory.11 
Misappropriation due to disclosure occurs when someone is given 
access to a trade secret and subsequently uses or discloses the trade 
secret without consent from the owner.12  Furthermore, courts will 
recognize misappropriation due to disclosure in the presence, or 
absence, of an express contract, i.e. an employment agreement.13 
In the event of misappropriation, the general remedy is an 
injunction.14  However, courts can also award damages in the form of 
royalties, lost profits, attorney’s fees, and/or punitive damages.15  Courts 
will issue injunctions at their discretion by applying the following 
factors: (1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm; (2) 
whether the plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits; (3) the 
balance of equity and harm between the parties; and (4) the interest of 
the public.16 
 
6. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
7. DAVID W. QUINTO & STUART H. SINGER, TRADE SECRETS 44 (Oxford 
University Press 2009). 
8. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 466 (Md. 2004); see also 
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985). 
9. LeJeune, 849 A.2d at 451. 
10. See Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2010). 
11. See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
12. See infra Section V (discussing cases in which misappropriation is threatened 
due to disclosure by a former employee). 
13. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 54–58. 
14. POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 7.02(2). 
15. Id. at § 7.02(3). 
16. Id. at § 7.02(2); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
44 (1995). 
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B. Introduction to Inevitable Disclosure 
In general, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows courts to enjoin 
an employee from working for his employer’s competitors because of 
the threat of misappropriation.  The employer must show that its 
employee had access to its trade secrets “and the former employee has 
such similar responsibilities with the new employer as to make it 
inevitable that he will use or disclose those trade secrets in the 
performance of his job duties for the new employer.”17  The idea is that 
an employee who wants to succeed at his new position will rely on skills 
and information learned from his former employer, including trade 
secrets.18  If an employer shows that its former employee will inevitably 
disclose its trade secrets to a competitor, the court can grant a 
preliminary injunction or, in rare circumstances, a permanent injunction 
against that employee from working for the competitor or from 
participating in certain kinds of work for the competitor.19 
There is a fundamental tension between competing interests when 
applying the doctrine: the need to protect an employer’s confidential, 
valuable information and the need to support an employee’s freedom of 
mobility.20  Despite these competing interests, courts have long 
recognized inevitable disclosure; however, it was not until the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond that the doctrine gained 
popularity.21 
III. THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Before analyzing the PepsiCo decision, it is important to discuss the 
predominant source of trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
Trade secrets engulf a wide, abstract area of subject matter, 
extending to any useful information that is kept secret.22  Consequently, 
the law of trade secrets, due to its broad subject matter and its common 
law development, as opposed to statutory development like copyrights 
and patents, has not been easily bundled into universally applicable 
principles.23  As a result, in 1979, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, acting on the recommendation 
 
17. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 56–57 (emphasis added). 
18. Id. at 91. 
19. Id.; UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1985). 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 (1995). 
21. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 91–92. 
22. POOLEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01. 
23. Id. 
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of the American Bar Association, issued the first of two versions of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).24  The primary goal was 
uniformity: stemming from the unsatisfactory development of trade 
secret law among the states.25  The lack of development was due in part 
to the far fewer number of reported judicial opinions regarding trade 
secret law in agricultural states compared to commercial states and the 
uncertain standards and remedies promulgated by the common law.26  
Ultimately, the commissioners wanted the UTSA to codify the common 
law of trade secrets.27 
Subsequently, forty–eight U.S. jurisdictions have adopted either the 
UTSA as drafted in 1979 or as amended in 1985, and apply the following 
definitions and remedies.28 
UTSA section 1(4) provides what is protected as trade secrets: 
‘Trade Secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, 
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject 
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.29 
Furthermore, section 1(2) provides the relevant types of 
misappropriation: acquisition by (1) improper means, or (2) disclosure, 
without express or implied consent, by improper means or under 
“circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy.”30  If 
misappropriation is proven, section 2(a) provides injunctive relief for 
“actual or threatened misappropriation.”31  This section contains 
important aspects relating to the duration of an injunction, providing 
that an injunction based on inevitable disclosure will be granted for a 
 
24. Id. at § 2.03(1). 
25. Id.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 1; see The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA) available at http://www.ndasforfree.com/UTSA.html last visited October 6, 2011 
(listing the states that have adopted the UTSA, and their respective statutes). 
29. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
30. Id. at § 1(2). 
31. Id. at § 2(a). 
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reasonable time in lieu of the specific information that is threatened.32  
Section 2(a) is important to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, though, 
because the term “threatened misappropriation” is considered the 
origin of the doctrine by many states applying their versions of the 
UTSA. 
However, the most important section of the UTSA is section 8, 
which states that “[t]his [A]ct shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to 
the subject of this Act among states enacting it.”33  The states, however, 
have failed to apply their respected versions of the Act in a uniform 
way, especially inevitable disclosure.  To begin the analysis of the states’ 
applications of the doctrine it is important to discuss the flagship case on 
the subject: PepsiCo. 
IV. THE PEPSICO DECISION 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond is 
considered the prominent case discussing inevitable disclosure after the 
adoption of the UTSA.  PepsiCo brought an action seeking a 
preliminary injunction against its employee, William Redmond, Jr. 
(Redmond), from accepting a position with PepsiCo’s competitor, 
Quaker.34  Redmond, who had been employed with PepsiCo for ten 
years, had access to PepsiCo’s financial goals and its strategic planning 
for the upcoming year; consequently, although he signed a 
confidentiality agreement stating he would not disclose confidential 
information, PepsiCo was concerned about the secrecy of its trade 
secrets.  This was mainly due to Redmond’s lack of candor regarding 
accepting the position at Quaker.35 
The district court granted an injunction against Redmond from 
assuming his position with Quaker for a period of five months, and 
granted a permanent injunction preventing him from using or disclosing 
PepsiCo’s trade secrets.36  The Seventh Circuit affirmed, determining 
that the Illinois Trade Secret Act provided injunctive relief for “actual 
or threatened misappropriation.”37 Ultimately, the court concluded “a 
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by 
 
32. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting an 
injunction for five months to protect an employers business strategies for the upcoming year). 
33. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (1985). 
34. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1264. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 1267. 
37. Id.; 765 ILCS 1065/3(a) (2009).  
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demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably 
lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”38  Additionally, the 
Seventh Circuit found (1) that Redmond possessed intimate knowledge 
of PepsiCo’s strategic goals, which were trade secrets; (2) that the 
respected positions were similar and therefore, the knowledge he 
obtained at PepsiCo would influence his position at Quaker39; and (3) 
that Redmond’s actions “demonstrated a lack of candor . . . and proof of 
[his] willingness to misuse [PepsiCo’s] trade secrets,” i.e. bad faith.40  
However, the court did not expressly state that bad faith must be 
present before injunctive relief will be granted. 
After PepsiCo, the inevitable disclosure doctrine gained popularity; 
however, despite a workable standard presented by the Seventh Circuit, 
the states’ applications of the doctrine have remained inconsistent. 
V. THE STATES’ APPLICATIONS OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 
Arkansas 
Arkansas has adopted a standard similar to PepsiCo.  In Cardinal 
Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transportation Service, Inc., the court 
recognized that many federal cases, including PepsiCo, “have held that a 
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade-secrets misappropriation by 
demonstrating that a defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead 
him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”41  However, in Bendinger v. 
Marshalltown Trowel Co., the court failed to grant an injunction, 
holding that “the mere fact a person assumes a similar position at a 
competitor does not, without more, make it inevitable that he will use or 
disclose trade secrets.”42 
Arkansas courts will grant an injunction if a new position will lead to 
the inevitable disclosure of a former employer’s trade secrets.  However, 
courts have established that more than the threat that future acts will 
disclose the trade secret is needed; there must be a showing that future 
acts will “in all probability” be committed that will disclose the trade 
secrets.43 
 
38. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269; see Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Commc'ns Corp., 707 F. 
Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
39. Id. at 1266–67. 
40. Id. at 1270. 
41. Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 
642, 646 (Ark. 1999) (citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
42. Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 474 (Ark. 1999) 
(quoting AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
43. Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (W.D. Ark. 
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California 
California has been hostile to the doctrine.44  Courts have 
consistently held that the doctrine “creates a de facto covenant not to 
compete” and “runs[s] counter to the strong public policy in California 
favoring employee mobility.”45  Further “regardless whether a covenant 
not to compete is part of the employment agreement, the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or 
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.”46 
However, courts are receptive to protecting trade secrets through an 
employment agreement that is narrowly drafted for the specific purpose 
of protecting trade secrets against misappropriation.47 
Colorado 
Colorado, like California, has strong policies favoring employee 
mobility.  Additionally, courts will not enforce employment agreements 
that hinder mobility because they are seen as a restraint on a person’s 
right to make a living; however, that right will be protected so long as 
that person does not use his former employer’s trade secrets to do so.48 
Colorado courts apply a two prong test to determine whether an 
employment agreement will be enforced to protect trade secrets: (1) the 
court will “examine the factual situation to determine whether a 
restrictive covenant is justified at all;” and (2) the court will look at the 
terms of the covenant to determine whether it is reasonable.49 
Although Colorado courts have not explicitly stated they will use the 
doctrine to protect trade secrets, like California, they will enforce an 
employment agreement that is reasonable in time and geographic scope, 
and narrowly drafted for the purpose of protecting trade secrets.50 
Connecticut 
Connecticut will apply the doctrine to enforce a non-compete, even 
without bad faith. 
When . . . a high degree of similarity between an employee’s 
former and current employment makes it likely that the former 
 
1999). 
44. QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 7, at 93. 
45. Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999). 
46. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (4th Dist. 2002). 
47. Id. 
48. Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 526–27 (Colo. App. 2011). 
49. Id. at 526. 
50. Id. 
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employer’s trade secrets . . . will be disclosed either intentionally 
or inadvertently, by the employee in the course of his new 
employment, enforcement of a covenant not to compete is 
necessary to protect against such use and disclosure.51 
In Aetna Retirement Services, Inc. v. Hug, the court granted an 
injunction against an employee despite its recognition that the employee 
had “unimpeachable integrity” and “honesty [that was] widely respected 
and admired.”52  Regardless, the court granted the injunction because it 
believed he could not help but inform his new employer of the 
knowledge he had gained from his past employer.53  Therefore, it is 
evident that Connecticut will apply the doctrine even in the absence of 
bad faith. 
Delaware 
The Delaware case E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. American 
Potash & Chemical Corp. was the first decision to use the phrase 
“inevitable disclosure,”54 so it is not surprising that Delaware applies the 
doctrine regardless of the existence of a non-compete agreement. 
In E.I. duPont, the court applied the doctrine stating Delaware law 
is “well settled” that when an employee, either expressly or by 
implication, has agreed not to disclose his employer’s trade secrets, “the 
employer is entitled to an injunction against a threatened use or 
disclosure of [the trade secrets].”55 
It is not clear whether bad faith is required.  However, in W.L. Gore 
v. Wu, the court, recognizing that an employee could not be trusted 
because of egregious conduct, expanded an injunction granted by the 
lower courts.  The court recognized that it “may limit a [former 
employee] from working in a particular field if his doing so poses a 
substantial risk of the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets.”56 
Florida 
Florida has mixed case law.  One court stated that Florida’s trade 
secret act “does not prohibit a former employee with knowledge of 
 
51. Aetna Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 WL 396212, 10 (Conn. Super.) 
(quoting Gillette Co. v. Williams, 360 F. Supp. 1171, 1176–77 (D.C. Conn. 1973)). 
52. Id. at 11. 
53. Id. 
54. Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee 
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. High. Tech. L. 161, 168 (2004). 
55. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 
428, 431 (Del. Ch. 1964). 
56. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Wu, 2006 WL 2692584, 17 (Del. Ch.). 
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trade secrets from going to work for a competitor.”57  The court 
reasoned that the act “prohibits only ‘misappropriation’ of trade secrets, 
which means the acquisition, disclosure, and/or use of the information to 
the disadvantage of the owner of the trade secret.”58 
However, in Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., the court 
upheld an injunction against an employee because “it would seem 
logical to assume that his employment by a competitor . . . would 
eventually result in a disclosure of [his former employer’s trade 
secrets].”59  Ultimately, the court determined that the employee’s 
knowledge of his former employer’s trade secrets was so entwined with 
his prospective position that an injunction against disclosure was not 
enough.60 
Georgia 
Although Georgia does not expressly use the doctrine, one court has 
enjoined a company from hiring its competitor’s employee because it 
determined the company only wanted the employee to gain a 
competitive advantage.61  The court determined that by hiring its 
competitor’s employee, the company was attempting to obtain its 
competitor’s trade secrets to gain a competitive edge in its industry.62 
Illinois63 
Indiana 
Indiana courts inconsistently apply the doctrine.  In 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, the court, although recognizing 
the doctrine, refused to apply it because Indiana’s trade secret act did 
“not prohibit a former employee who has knowledge of trade secrets 
from going to work for a competitor.”64  The court determined that the 
statute only prohibits misappropriation.65  However, the court 
distinguished this case with another Indiana case, Ackerman v. Kimball 
International, Inc.  In Ackerman, there was clear evidence that the 
 
57. Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 
1335 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
58. Id. 
59. Fountain v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1960). 
60. Id. 
61. Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501, 505 (Ga. 1998). 
62. Id. 
63. See infra Section IV. 
64. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (S.D. Ind. 
1998). 
65. Id. 
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departing employee had no intention of honoring the confidentiality of 
his employer’s trade secrets; consequently, a limited injunction was 
granted prohibiting him from working for a competitor.66  Ultimately, it 
seems that Indiana will enforce a limited injunction, but only when the 
threat of misappropriation is shown by bad faith. 
Iowa 
Iowa courts treat the doctrine as a strict variation of threatened 
misappropriation.67  In Barilla America, Inc. v. Wright, the court, 
analyzing PepsiCo, determined that its state statute that illegalized 
threatened misappropriation included inevitable disclosure.68  To prove 
inevitable disclosure an employer must show (1) that its employee had 
access to its trade secrets; (2) that its employee’s new position is similar 
to the former position; and (3) “that [the employee] would be able to 
remember the trade secret in a usable form.”69  In Barilla, the court 
enjoined an employee from taking a position with a competitor because, 
although there was no evidence that he memorized any trade secrets, 
there was proof that he took physical evidence with him.70 
Kansas 
Kansas is yet to apply the doctrine, although it has come close.  In 
Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-DuCros, the court acknowledged the doctrine 
but failed to apply it because the limitation period for the plaintiff’s 
cause of action had expired.71  However, when discussing the doctrine, 
the court, quoting PepsiCo, provided that an employer was entitled to 
relief when: 
(1) the employers in question are direct competitors providing 
the same or very similar products or services; (2) the employee’s 
new position is nearly identical to his old one, such that he could 
not reasonably be expected to fulfill his new job responsibilities 
without utilizing the trade secrets of his former employer; and (3) 
the trade secrets at issue are highly valuable to both employers.72 
 
66. Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 510–11 (Ind. 1995). 
67. Barilla America, Inc. v. Wright, 2002 WL 31165069, 9 (S.D. Iowa). 
68. Id. at 8–9. 
69. Id. at 10. 
70. Id.; see also APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 
1997); Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Diversified 
Fastening Sys, Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Iowa 1991). 
71. Bradbury Co., Inc. v. Teissier-DuCros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (D. Kan. 
2006). 
72. Id. at 1208 (quoting EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 
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Kentucky 
Kentucky is also yet to address the doctrine.  In Invesco Institutional 
(N.A.), Inc. v. Johnson, the plaintiff included a cause of action for 
inevitable disclosure; however, the district court was hesitant to apply it, 
stating “[a]bsent some authoritative signal from the legislature or the 
courts of [this state], we see no basis for even considering the pros and 
cons of innovative theories.”73 
Louisiana 
Louisiana has rejected the use of inevitable disclosure, concluding 
that an injunction in the absence of actual or threatened 
misappropriation is a harsh remedy.74  Furthermore, in Tubular 
Threading, Inc. v. Scandaliato, the court insisted the employer must 
show a clear and present need for an injunction because of an 
immediate threat of disclosure, mere speculation is not enough.75 
Maryland 
Like California, Maryland favors employee mobility.76  After 
balancing the competing public policies of employee mobility against 
protection of trade secrets, and finding an injunction against the 
disclosure of trade secrets to be an injunction against employee 
mobility, Maryland courts have rejected inevitable disclosure.77 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts applies the doctrine, but is yet to officially adopt it or 
the UTSA.  In Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, the court granted an 
injunction against an employee to enforce a non-compete agreement 
despite bad faith.78  The court determined the former employer would 
be disadvantaged in the absence of an injunction because “it [was] 
difficult to conceive how all of the information stored in [the 
employee’s] memory [could] be set aside as he applie[d] himself to a 
competitor’s business . . . .”79 
Conversely, in Achitext, Inc. v. Kikuchi, the court determined that 
Massachusetts had not yet adopted the doctrine but “[e]ven if it were 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
73. Invesco Inst. (N.A.), Inc. v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710 (W.D. Ky. 
2007). 
74. Tubular Threading, Inc. v. Scandaliato, 443 So. 2d 712, 715 (La. Ct. App. 
1983).  
75. Id. 
76. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 471 (Md. 2004). 
77. Id. 
78. Marcam Corp. v. Orchard, 885 F. Supp. 294, 298–300 (D. Mass. 1995). 
79. Id. at 297. 
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appropriate . . . to rely on the doctrine of ‘inevitable disclosure,’ this 
situation is not one that would warrant application of the doctrine.”80 
Ultimately, courts have provided mixed views of the doctrine: 
applying it in one case to enforce a non-compete in the absence of bad 
faith, and declaring that it is yet to be adopted in another. 
Michigan 
Michigan is another state lacking definitive case law regarding the 
doctrine.  In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation 
& Engineering Corp., the court granted a limited injunction against an 
employee from performing certain duties during his new employment 
with a competitor because there was a threat he would inevitably use his 
former employer’s trade secrets.81 
Other courts, however, have held otherwise.  In CMI International, 
Inc. v. Intermet International Corp., and subsequently Kelly Services, 
Inc. v. Greene, it was determined that “for a party to make a claim of 
threatened misappropriation, whether under a theory of inevitable 
disclosure or otherwise, the party must establish more than the 
existence of generalized trade secrets and a competitor’s employment of 
the party’s former employee who has knowledge of trade secrets.”82 
Furthermore, some courts acknowledge that the doctrine, although 
never adopted in Michigan, “has only been suggested to be applicable to 
high executives and key designers of the company’s strategic plans and 
operations.”83 
Minnesota 
Some Minnesota courts have embraced the doctrine to enforce a 
non-compete, while others have been harsh to the doctrine in the 
absence of actual or threatened misappropriation. 
In La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, the court, applying a state statute that 
enjoined “actual or threatened misappropriation,” enforced a non-
compete and enjoined an employee form working for a competitor 
because he had such intimate knowledge that it was “all but inevitable 
that he [would] utilize that knowledge during his work with [the 
competitor].”84  The court determined that this “intimate knowledge” 
 
80. Achitext, Inc. v. Kikuchi, 2005 WL 2864244, 3 (Mass.). 
81. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966). 
82. CMI Int'l, Inc. v. Intermet Int'l Corp., 649 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2002); Kelly Servs., Inc. v. Greene, 535 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D. Me. 2008). 
83. Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 471 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (W.D. Mich. 
2007). 
84. La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (applying 
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made the threat of misappropriation real.85 
However, some courts have suggested the mere fact that an 
employee possesses trade secrets and is taking a comparable position at 
a competitor is inadequate to warrant an injunction.86  In International 
Business Machine Corp. v. Seagate Technology, Inc., the court denied 
injunctive relief in the absence of an actual threat of misappropriation, 
stating that protection is a shield, not a sword, and “in the absence of a 
covenant not to compete or a finding of actual or an intent to disclose 
trade secrets, employees ‘may pursue their chosen field of endeavor in 
direct competition’ with their prior employer.”87 
Missouri 
Ultimately, Missouri courts have been reluctant to apply the 
doctrine, although many courts have thoroughly discussed the doctrine 
as presented in PepsiCo.  Courts acknowledge the doctrine may be used 
in rare circumstances, suggesting “that inevitability alone is insufficient 
to justify injunctive relief; rather, demonstrated inevitability in 
combination with a finding that there is unwillingness to preserve 
confidentiality is required.”88 
Additionally, in H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc. v. Enchura, 
the court suggested other factors that might be analyzed in determining 
whether to apply the doctrine: whether the employee will have a 
decision making role at the new employment; whether the 
responsibilities at the respective jobs are similar; whether the employee 
will be developing new products; whether the employee was involved in 
the creation of the trade secrets at issue; and whether the trade secrets 
are easily subject to memorization.89 
New Jersey 
New Jersey has not adopted the UTSA.  Regardless, courts are 
mixed on when to grant an injunction to prevent inevitable disclosure.  
In National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Parker Chemical Corp, the court 
upheld an injunction against an employer from working for a competitor 




86. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 
1992). 
87. Id. (quoting E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112 (8th 
Cir. 1969)). 
88. H & R Block Eastern Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 
(W.D. Mo. 2000). 
89. Id. at 1075–76. 
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inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets that would result in immediate 
harm.90  The court’s decision was based on its finding that only five to 
ten percent (5–10%) of the duties at the employee’s new job were 
similar enough to threaten inevitable disclosure.91 
Conversely, in Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 
the court determined that an injunction may not be granted to eliminate 
the possibility of a remote injury.92  The court went on to state that the 
applicable standard for granting injunctive relief is “a ‘clear showing of 
immediate irreparable injury’ or a ‘presently existing actual threat.’”93 
New York 
New York also has not adopted the UTSA.  Regardless, there are 
many opinions addressing the issue of inevitable disclosure.  Numerous 
opinions embrace the doctrine in multiple forms,94 while more recent 
opinions tend to disfavor its use all together.95 
North Carolina 
North Carolina recognizes inevitable disclosure and will enjoin 
threatened misappropriation when the injunction is narrowly drafted to 
protect specific, clearly identified, and significantly valuable trade 
secrets.96  Further, bad faith is not necessarily required: a showing of 
disclosure due to the similarity between the two positions and the value 
of the information will suffice.97 
The predominant test applied by North Carolina courts comes from 
the case Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner.  The Travenol court 
reluctantly established that an injunction against an employee 
 
90. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 33 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1987). 
91. Id. 
92. Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980). 
93. Id. (quoting Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1976), and 
Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969)).  
94. See The Estee Lauder Co. Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Int'l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. 
Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Integr. Cash Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Trans., Inc., 732 F. 
Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);  Business Intell. Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976); Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prod., 189 A.D. 556 (N.Y.A.D. 1919); Spinal Dimensions, Inc. v. 
Chepenuk, 2007 WL 2296503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, 1997 WL 
731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). 
95. See Payment Alliance Int'l, Inc. v. Ferreira, 530 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 301 A.D.2d 734 (N.Y.S.D. 2003); Earthweb, Inc. v. 
Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
96. Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996). 
97. Id. 
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protecting a former employer’s trade secrets was proper because the 
possibility of disclosure was high.98  Factors to consider are (1) the 
circumstances surrounding the employee’s termination; (2) the 
importance of the former employee’s position; (3) the responsibilities of 
the former employee at his new position; and (4) the information sought 
to be protected and the value or need of the information to the 
competitor.99 
Ohio 
Although Ohio courts do not explicitly refer to the doctrine in 
granting injunctive relief, they will enforce a non-compete when an 
actual threat of harm exists that includes an employee’s possession of an 
employer’s trade secrets and the subsequent employment in a position 
in direct competition with the employer.100 
Pennsylvania 
In 2010, in the absence of the UTSA, the Third Circuit, applying 
Pennsylvania law, applied what appears to be a more lenient version of 
the doctrine.  The court upheld a district court’s injunction against an 
employee in the presence of a non-compete and bad faith, because 
“there was ‘a substantial likelihood, if not an inevitability, that [the 
employee] will disclose or use [the employer’s] trade secrets in the 
course of his employment with [the competitor].’”101 
Ultimately, this standard appears more relaxed than the PepsiCo 
standard, calling for only a “substantial likelihood” of disclosure.  Also, 
it is unclear whether bad faith is required before granting an injunction. 
Texas 
Texas, in the absence of the UTSA, has inconsistently applied the 
doctrine.102  No case law expressly uses the term inevitable disclosure to 
grant injunctive relief; however, in Rugen v. Interactive Business 
Systems, Inc., the court upheld an injunction against an employee 
finding that, even in the absence of an enforceable employment 
agreement, “a former employee is precluded from using for his own 
advantage, and to the detriment of his former employer, confidential 
information or trade secrets acquired by or imparted to him in the 
 
98. Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Turner, 228 S.E.2d 478, 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
99. Id. 
100. Kemper Mortg., Inc. v. Russell, 2006 WL 4968120, 4–5 (S.D. Ohio); see also 
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). 
101. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
102. QUINTO AND SINGER, supra note 7, at 100. 
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course of his employment.”103  Ultimately, the court found evidence that 
the employee possessed confidential information and was operating a 
business in direct competition with her former employer; consequently, 
the court held it was “probable” that the employee would use the 
confidential information “for her benefit and to the detriment of [her 
former employer].”104 
However, in the 2003 case Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. 
Bowen, although the court determined that the doctrine was 
inapplicable because of the specific circumstances of the case, it did 
state that it knew of “no Texas case expressly adopting the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, and it is unclear to what extent Texas courts might 
adopt it or might view it as relieving an injunction applicant of showing 
irreparable injury.”105 
Utah 
Utah, in adopting the UTSA, provides that “actual or threatened 
misappropriation may be enjoined,” and ultimately interprets 
“threatened misappropriation” to include inevitable disclosure.106 
The doctrine was first introduced in Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos 
Research Group Inc.  In Novell, the court reasoned that inevitable 
disclosure was a cause of action for “threatened misappropriation” since 
it was consistent with Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which allows for a preliminary injunction for a “threatened injury.”107  
Ultimately, “the doctrine of inevitability is used to show that the 
probability of a threatened injury or misappropriation is so high that it 
becomes ‘inevitable.’”108 
Virginia 
Virginia does not recognize inevitable disclosure.109  Only actual or 
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined: the “mere knowledge of 
 
103. Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex. App. 1993) 
(quoting Johnson v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ. 
App.–Dallas 1975)).  
104. Id. at 552; see also T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 
965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App. 1998); Conley v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 1999 WL 89955 (Tex. 
App.). 
105. Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 242 (Tex. 
App. 2003). 
106. Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197, 
1215 (Utah D.C. 1998). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Gov. Tech. Servs., Inc. v. IntelliSys Tech. Corp., WL 1499548, 1 (Va. Cir. 
Ct.). 
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trade secrets is insufficient to support an injunction under . . .[Virginia 
law].”110 
Washington 
Applying the doctrine consistent with PepsiCo, Washington courts 
grant an injunction against an employee “where there is a high degree of 
probability of inevitable and immediate . . . use of . . . trade secrets.”111 
VI. A PROPOSED WORKABLE STANDARD 
It is apparent that, even after the adoption of the UTSA and after 
PepsiCo presented a seemingly workable standard, the states will 
continue to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine differently, contrary 
to section 8 of the UTSA.  The ultimate solution is enacting federal 
legislation addressing trade secret protection, much like the other areas 
of IP law.  However, this argument will focus specifically on a solution, 
in the form of a workable standard, to the problem of the lack of 
uniformity regarding the states’ applications of inevitable disclosure. 
Ultimately, the doctrine should be viewed as originating in section 
2(a) of the UTSA, which grants relief for “actual or threatened 
misappropriation,” because that is exactly what inevitable disclosure is: 
the threat that an employer’s trade secrets will be misappropriated 
during the course of the employee’s subsequent employment.  It should 
simply be characterized as threatened misappropriation subject to a 
stricter standard. 
Ultimately, the key to inevitable disclosure is that it should only be 
applied in rare circumstances because of its hindering effect on 
employee mobility.  Moreover, in applying the doctrine, the initial 
question the court should address is whether a valid employment 
agreement exists. 
A.  The Doctrine in the Presence of an Employment Agreement. 
Courts applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine should give 
deference to an employment agreement that is narrowly drafted for the 
purpose of protecting a company’s trade secrets.  If the court initially 
determines that a valid, narrowly drafted, employment agreement 
exists, then the burden should be on the employer to show the 
following: (1) that the employee was given access to the employer’s 
 
110. Motion Control Sys., Inc. v. East, 546 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Va. 2001). 
111. Solutec Corp, Inc. v. Agnew, 1997 WL 794496, 8 (Wash. Ct. App.) (quoting 
Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Temco Metal Prods. v. 
GT Dev. Corp., 2000 WL 556607 (D. Or.). 
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trade secrets during his employment; (2) that the employee has taken a 
position with a company that is in direct competition with the employer; 
and (3) that the employee’s responsibilities at the competitor are similar 
to his responsibilities with the former employer, such that the employee 
will be unable to complete those responsibilities without relying on the 
employer’s trade secrets. 
Ultimately, if a former employee has signed an employment 
agreement that is narrowly drafted to protect the drafting company’s 
trade secrets and the employer has shown all three factors there should 
be a presumption in favor of enforcing the agreement and enjoining the 
employee from taking a position with a competitor.  Additionally, the 
injunction should be reasonable in scope and duration to protect against 
disclosure, even in the absence of bad faith on behalf of the former 
employee. 
B.  The Doctrine in the Absence of an Employment Agreement 
If the court initially determines that there was not a valid 
employment agreement then there should be a presumption against 
enjoining the employee from taking a position with a competitor.  Since 
an employer is in a superior bargaining position when hiring employees, 
and has the ability to condition employment upon the signing of an 
employment agreement, if it fails to execute an agreement it should not 
be permitted to obtain relief when an employee chooses to leave for a 
competitor. 
In this situation, the employer should again show the three elements 
provided above.  However, in addition, the employer should also show a 
fourth element: that there was bad faith on the part of the employee.112  
If the employer is able to show the presence of all four elements, there 
should be a strong presumption in favor of injunctive relief. 
This standard excludes relief for situations in which an employment 
agreement does not exist and there was no bad faith or intent to disclose 
on the part of the employee.  This is so because, given their inferior 
bargaining power compared to employers, employees should not be 
enjoined from accepting future employment opportunities in the 
absence of any bad faith on their behalf; if an employer fails to have its 
employees sign an employment agreement that protects its trade secrets, 
it should not be able to impose an after-the-fact restriction on future 
employee mobility.  Furthermore, the company still has other remedies 
available should actual misappropriation occur after a former employee 
 
112. PepsiCo and Bimbo provide examples of employee bad faith. 
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begins work for a competitor. 
C.  The Standard as a Whole 
Ultimately, the inevitable disclosure doctrine should be used in rare 
circumstances.  When it is applied, and an injunction granted, the 
injunction should be reasonable in scope and duration, taking into effect 
the information to be protected.  The court should initially determine 
whether there is a valid employment agreement that is narrowly drafted 
for the specific purpose of protecting the employer’s trade secrets.  If so, 
the employer bears the burden of showing the following three factors: 
(1)  that the employee was given access to the employer’s trade 
secrets during his or her employment; 
(2)  that the employee has taken a position with a company that is 
in direct competition with the employer; and 
(3)  that the employee’s responsibilities at the competitor are 
similar to his or her responsibilities with the former employer, 
such that the employee will be unable to complete those 
responsibilities without relying on the employer’s trade secrets 
Furthermore, if no employment agreement is present the employer 
should have to show an additional factor: 
(4)  that there was bad faith or an intent to disclose the trade 
secret on the part of the employee 
However, in the absence of a valid, narrowly tailored, employment 
agreement and bad faith, a court should not enjoin an employer from 
working for his former employer’s competitor. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine protects against threatened 
misappropriation of trade secrets due to a company’s former employee 
taking a similar position with one of its competitors.  However, even 
after the majority of the states adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
there was, and is, a lack of uniformity in applying a workable standard.  
This lack of uniformity is directly contrary to section 8 of the UTSA, 
which specifically calls for the uniform application of trade secret laws 
by the states adopting the Act.  Consequently, there is a need for 
uniformity among the states’ applications of trade secret law, and more 
specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  Uniformity could be 
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accomplished by federal legislation regulating trade secret law, much 
like the other areas of intellectual property; however, for purposes of 
this comment, only a specific standard for applying the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine was presented. 
In presenting a proposed standard it is important to note that the 
doctrine should be applied rarely, and deference should be given to 
employers that utilize valid employment agreements in an attempt to 
protect their trade secrets.  An injunction should then be imposed if the 
employee had access to a trade secret and the employee’s new position 
is at a competitor and is similar to his or her former position.  However, 
if a valid employment agreement is not present, the doctrine should not 
be utilized unless there is a showing of employee bad faith. 
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